The center-left and liberal elites seem to be anti-China because China's rise threatens their status, influence, prestige, and power. It also undermines the ideology they promote.
The right-wing seems to be anti-China because it's an out-group - a non-white, non-Western race and civilization. Right-wingers identify with Russia because it's white, semi-Western, and Christian, but China is too foreign for them to identify with.
Well the most curious thing about it is that it was entirely self-financed (unlike the bubbles in the countries most severely hit by the 1997 crisis) and didn't lead to major Yen depreciation. Domestic investment didn't exceed savings. Inflation was also rather subdued until late into the boom. That doesn't sound like a bubble driven by monetary policy to me, though I may be missing some obvious signs.
Compare the U.S. housing bubble: major and increasing current account deficit, rising GDP deflator inflation (until 2006, when housing started crashing), a substantial decline in the international value of the U.S. dollar.
Well, Werner thinks it's because the banks lent money for real estate transaction, and therefore affected mainly asset prices, not the wider economy. Interestingly the Japanese yen did actually depreciate a little bit from 1988-1990.
Also Japanese NGDP growth actually did accelerate in 1988. Japanese NGDP growth in 1981-1987 was in the 4.5-6.5% range (4.5% in 1987), in 1988-1990 it was in the 7-7.5% range)
The center-left and liberal elites seem to be anti-China because China's rise threatens their status, influence, prestige, and power. It also undermines the ideology they promote.
The right-wing seems to be anti-China because it's an out-group - a non-white, non-Western race and civilization. Right-wingers identify with Russia because it's white, semi-Western, and Christian, but China is too foreign for them to identify with.
Also I'm interested in how you would describe the Japanese bubble.
Well the most curious thing about it is that it was entirely self-financed (unlike the bubbles in the countries most severely hit by the 1997 crisis) and didn't lead to major Yen depreciation. Domestic investment didn't exceed savings. Inflation was also rather subdued until late into the boom. That doesn't sound like a bubble driven by monetary policy to me, though I may be missing some obvious signs.
Compare the U.S. housing bubble: major and increasing current account deficit, rising GDP deflator inflation (until 2006, when housing started crashing), a substantial decline in the international value of the U.S. dollar.
Well, Werner thinks it's because the banks lent money for real estate transaction, and therefore affected mainly asset prices, not the wider economy. Interestingly the Japanese yen did actually depreciate a little bit from 1988-1990.
Also Japanese NGDP growth actually did accelerate in 1988. Japanese NGDP growth in 1981-1987 was in the 4.5-6.5% range (4.5% in 1987), in 1988-1990 it was in the 7-7.5% range)
I don't like BAP's book but on twitter he was pretty great. I also don't support the rise of China because it is hostile towards western countries.
I agree with most of the rest.