The Mystery of American power
Recently, a notable Twitter poster wrote a post defending the idea that American power will continue into the 21st century, and possibly for as long as a thousand years. I promised to write a response to the post, and so I will do so here.
The primary argument the author makes is that while China is, at least for now, apparently destined to remain the second greatest global power, this second place ranking is likely permanent due to Chinese demographic headwinds and residual American assets.
To show that population growth matters for national power is trivial. Germany’s rise relative to France between the Franco-Prussian War and the First World War owed itself almost entirely to population growth. The rise of Japan relative to the Western powers and China during the first half of the 20th century owed as much to its above-trend population growth and its conquest of Korea as it did to the development of its economy. The same can be said for the rise of Latin America up until 1980. Russia’s relative decline in national power between 1980 and 2020 can be accounted for almost entirely by its population decline. It is notable that America’s hold over Europe was much stronger over the second half of the 20th century while its GDP per capita advantage was much less, though its population advantage was much greater.
The primary problem with the argument Chinese demographic headwinds will prevent China from becoming #1 is fairly straightforward -we don’t know future demographics very well. A straightforward extrapolation of American and Japanese population growth during the 1930s would have predicted a balance much less favorable to the U.S. than actually occured. Of course, if the population projections are correct -a bad century of Chinese fertility, a relatively better century for American fertility, and continued faster U.S. population growth due to immigration (especially Asian immigration), America remaining the world’s only superpower into 2100 will more likely than not come to pass. The U.S. has a higher TFR than China, and this has been true for several decades, but will it be true in 2030? The 2010s experienced a steep decline in American fertility, and China’s government, which is known for decisive action in numerous fields, is coming around to the view its demographic weakness is a looming threat, rather than the source of strength inherent in its one child policy. The sources of population growth in the U.S. of the future also seem rather difficult to predict. The White population in the U.S. is already declining. Immigration might overshoot projections, or undershoot, as it did in the 2010s relative to the 2000s. Fertility might overshoot projections, as in the 1990s, or it might seriously undershoot, as it did over the past six years. In my view, the White population of the U.S. is likely to decline faster than projected, leaving us with uncertainty about the fate of American power.
The most likely future of American immigration during the 21st century, in my view, is a complete swamping by the rising Sub-Saharan African population. My reasoning for this is simple. Ever since the late 1990s, the growing trend for Americans has been greater acceptance of immigration than in the past, and there is no reason for this to reverse over the coming generations. Similarly, anti-Black racism has been anathema in all facets of American political life since the 1960s, and this has has only accelerated with the overt support of ghetto riots by the elite in 2020. The general trend of American history has been a greater acceptance of demographics previously considered ineligible to enter the top ranks of the elite, and there is no reason for this trend to reverse (and it would need to outright reverse in a major way, not just stop) during the rest of the 21st century. The result of this is that the American Black and American total population is likely to be much larger in 2100 than projected in 2020, while America’s per capita GDP ranking is likely to slip. No American today is willing to say “I do not want this country to become majority Black”, and no American is likely to say it when the logical consequences of this silence, as a ball rolling down a slope, inevitably reaches its destination. Whatever resistance to interracial marriage which exists today will also likely be a thing of the past by 2100, making the survival of any large fraction of the population with the ability to advance human knowledge in doubt. Whether this will negatively affect America’s capability to project financial, military, and cultural power remains unclear, but, as American living standards slip, some degree of Europeans waking up from the American dream remains a possibility.
Of course, what happens to America may well happen to China eventually, but China’s foundational principles have been far less conducive to wholesale demographic replacement by Africans than those of the post-1960s, and especially those of the post-2010s U.S. The likely coming negrification of American society likely at least presents an opportunity for greater European and allied Asian independence or for China to increase its global standing, both of which will result in dents in American power.
China’s economic growth seems more predictable than its demographic situation, but is also one of the more crucial questions for determining the future of American power. One of the primary reasons America is so dominant in European affairs is precisely because it is richer than Europe, and is thus able to have a financial system closely connected to Europe. U.S. investors control a large share of European financial assets. U.S. sanctions on Japan during the Sino-Japanese war crippled its capability to project power into China (on this see Japan Prepares for Total War by Michael Barnhart, 1987). China’s power is greatest precisely in those countries that are poorer than it. If China is able to converge with Europe economically and more closely integrate its financial system with that of Europe -both unlikely, but far from impossible propositions- then it will likely be able to flip Europe away from its current geopolitical alignment and thus become a superpower in its own right without any great improvement in its military capability or even its demographic situation.
I also disagree a Chinese takeover of Taiwan would be very difficult (台灣’s army, unlike South 고려’s or Ukraine’s, seems a paper tiger as of the moment), though much could change for either side over the next decades. Of course, given the island’s relatively small population, a Chinese takeover of Taiwan would be about as geopolitically significant as the Russian reunification with Crimea- insignificant in and of itself, and strongly dependent on how its neighbors react to be judged whether it enhances or contracts Chinese power.
As for some speculative trivia, if the U.S. disappeared, the greatest geopolitical benefit would be to, firstly, Germany, and, secondly, Britain, while Japan would gain even more cultural power than it already has. The twenty-first century would be a Chinese century, certainly, but it would be just as importantly a German/Japanese century. America, after all, became so powerful partly due to it being the third most populous country in the world and the richest by actual individual consumption. Germany is both the most populous country in Europe West of the Dnepr and the one with the highest per capita actual individual consumption, while Japan is the most populous Asian country outside of China, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan and its actual individual consumption is about as good as it gets by Asian standards. Though China’s per capita income is likely underestimated (most likely due to an overstated population), it is highly unlikely any major part of China will come to as close as rich as Japan, much less Germany, making it impossible for China to represent a high standard of living the same way America did ever since the mid-eighteenth century. If there is to be geopolitical competition, it would likely be very much along the lines of China and Russia opposing the aligned Germany, Japan, and Britain. The Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and South and Southeast Asia would likely be minor prizes for both sides, while Latin America would likely stay neutral.